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摘  要 
股利政策是现代公司理财活动的三大核心内容之一。自从 1961 年 Miller 和







































Dividend policy is one of the three core financial activities in modern company. 
Since Miller and Modigliani published their classical paper in 1961, there have been 
many different ideas coming out to challenge the MM theory. After more than 40 years 
of evolution, dividend policy theory has been enriched and developed from many 
aspects, though until today research is still going on and there has not been a widely 
accepted conclusion. 
Agency theory is one of the mainstream theories to explain the dividend policy. Its 
basic idea is that, dividend policy can be used to solve the agency problem arisen from 
the separation of ownership and managerial authority effectively. Early researches on 
corporation governance focus primarily on the traditional agency problem. While in 
recent years, some scholars point out that, except in several highly market-oriented 
countries like the U.S. and UK, where company is controlled by a large number of 
shareholders, in most other countries, the ownership structure is much more 
concentrated, which brings out another problem that large shareholders expropriate 
minority shareholders to pursue private benefits. 
In year 2000, in an effort to regulate operation of the stock market and protect the 
benefit of minority shareholders, the China Securities Regulatory Commission put it a 
prerequisite for listed company to distribute cash dividend before they're allowed to 
issue more stocks. However, it's still out of control whether the large shareholders make 
dividend policy based on their own benefits or not. Another point is that, it's difficult to 
tell if purpose of distribution of cash dividend is really to reduce the amount of cash 
surplus, or simply a bait dropped by the large shareholders to net in more money. The 
author tries to focus on the "Agency Theory" of the dividend policy, analyze the 
characteristics and affecting factors of dividend distribution in Chinese listed companies 
and, applicability of the foreign "Agency Theory" in China. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is a summary of literatures 
referred to, outlining the primary dividend policy theories prevailing in western 
countries, and corresponding researches carried out in China. Chapter 2 is the detailed 
analysis, with description of existing dividend policy in Chinese listed companies, 















with the application of Agency Theory in China, and brings out hypothesis and ideas. 
Chapter 3 lists out research methods used and concept of design, including selection of 
samples, source of data, definition of variables and descriptive statistics. Chapter 4 is 
the result and verification of empirical study, with factor analysis, regression analysis, 
and robustness test. Chapter 5 is the conclusion with limitation of subject thesis and 
suggested direction of further research. 
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前   言 
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前  言 
自从 1961 年 Miller 和 Modigliani 提出“股利无关论”以来，学术界不断对
MM 理论提出挑战，很多学者在放宽其假设条件的基础上先后提出了顾客效应理
论（clientele effect theory）、信号理论（signaling theory）和代理成本理论（agency 
cost theory）。这些理论试图从不同的角度对股利政策做出解释，然而迄今为止，尚
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长期以来，中国上市公司的吝于分红，特别是吝于现金分红一直被市场所诟
病。但从 2000 年开始，上市公司现金分红情况明显改善。2000 年和 2001 年年终
分红派现的 A 股上市公司均为 669 家，比 1998 年的 239 家和 1999 年的 278 家均
增加了一倍多；在随后的 2002 年分配现金股利的 A 股公司中，57 家公司每股派
现 0.3 元以上，134 家公司进行了“蜻蜓点水”式的分红（每股派现为 0.05 元或以






















                                                        
① 如 G 川化，股票代码 000155，2004 年，每股收益 0.0066 元，每股派现 0.1 元，股利支付率为 15.15。 
② 如 G 连友谊，股票代码 000679，2003 年，每股收益－0.039 元，每股派现 0.05 元。 
③ 吕长江，周县华，公司治理结构与股利分配动机——基于代理成本和利益侵占的分析，南开管理评论，2005
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第一章  文献综述 
本章将对有关研究股利政策在理论和实证方面的文献进行回顾和评述，作为
建立本文理论分析的基础。 






















                                                        













第一章  文献综述 

























对 1964—1970 年间 914 位投资者的投资组合进行研究，结果显示投资者愈年轻，
收入愈高以及资本利得税与股利所得税的税率差距愈大，其所投资股票的收益率
                                                        
① Farrar, D. and Selwyn, L., “Taxes, Corporate Financial Policy and Return to Investors”, National Taxes Journal, 
December 1967; Brennan, M. J., “Taxes, Market Valuation, and Corporate Financial Policy”, National Taxes Journal, 










































                                                        
① Jensen, Michael C. and Meckling, William H., “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost, and 
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成本， 优的股利政策应该是使代理成本和交易成本之和 小。Llyod, Jahera 和






金流量，从而降低代理成本。Moh'd、Perry 和 Rimbey（1995）用时间序列法对 1972
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使用“隧道挖掘（tunneling）”一词来描述控股股东转移公司资源的行为，当法律











以 1998 年我国上市公司推出的 1997 年度股利分配预案的市场反应进行了实证分
析，得出股利分配政策与公司股票价格相关的结论。魏刚（2000）选取了 1992—
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